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Abstract: When summarizing the fi ndings of his 1896 Matter and Memory, Bergson 
claims: “That every reality has . . . a relation with consciousness—this is what we concede 
to idealism.” Yet Bergson’s 1896 text presents the theory of “pure perception,” which, since 
it accounts for perception according to the brain’s mechanical transmissions, apparently 
leaves no room for subjective consciousness. Bergson’s theory of pure perception would 
appear to render his idealistic concession absurd. In this paper, I attempt to defend 
Bergson’s idealistic concession. I argue that Bergson’s account of cerebral transmissions 
at the level of pure perception necessarily entails a theory of temporality, an appeal to 
a theory of time-consciousness that justifi es his idealistic concession.
When summarizing the fi ndings of his 1896 Matter and Memory,1 Bergson makes a rather strong and—perhaps to some—peculiar concession to 
idealism; he writes, “That every reality has . . . a relation with consciousness—this 
is what we concede to idealism. . . . No philosophical doctrine, moreover, provided 
that it is consistent with itself, can escape from this conclusion” (360/229). One 
only need refl ect briefl y upon the title of the work in question, with its priori-
tized order of terms and dualistic assumption, to discern the tension created by 
Bergson’s idealistic concession (IC). And if one penetrates the pages of this rich 
and complex work and examines the theory of pure perception (PP) therein, then 
the tension heightens, for Bergson’s theory accounts for perception according to 
the brain’s mechanical transmissions. Unsurprisingly, phenomenologists from 
the second to the present generation, as well as contemporary Bergsonists, have 
concluded that Bergson’s theory of PP renders his IC absurd.2 In this paper, I at-
tempt to defend Bergson’s IC by appealing to the view of temporality at the base 
of his theory of PP. Such a defense comes by way of examining Bergson’s account 
of the relation between memory and PP. While Bergson confusedly expresses this 
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distinction between memory and PP, his account of the preservation of cerebral 
stimuli invites us to clarify this distinction by appealing to Husserl’s view of inner 
time-consciousness and thereby justify his IC.
In section one, I explain the tension between Bergson’s theory of PP and his 
IC. In section two, I consider the possibility of reconciling PP and IC by examining 
Bergson’s account of bodily consciousness, which reveals two central claims in 
Bergson’s account of PP: (1) PP entails duration because “every sensation trans-
lates a . . . succession . . . of vibrations,” and (2) duration at the level of PP entails 
durée, i.e., consciousness’ “memory of . . . immediate experience . . . not memory 
of former experience” (280, 377/138, 249). These claims, I argue in section three, 
reveal that Bergson’s account of PP implies a consciousness of temporal distention, 
which view amounts to something quite similar to Husserl’s distinction between 
retention and memory. In short, we shall see that Bergson’s theory of PP entails a 
theory of time-consciousness that underscores the sensibility of IC.
1. The Idealistic Concession and Pure Perception: 
A Hypothetical Concession to Materialism
Bergson begins Matter and Memory with an assumption designed to overcome 
philosophy’s persistent “problem of appearances.” Bergson’s assumption amounts 
to a methodological move designed to circumvent the ontological opposition of 
inner to outer. He writes,
We . . . assume for the moment that we know nothing of the theories of matter 
and . . . the theories of spirit, nothing of the discussions concerning the reality 
or ideality of the external world. (169/17)
Like Husserl’s epoché 3 Bergson’s methodological suspension of dogmatic beliefs 
about the world, does not amount to a Cartesian denial of the external world. 
Rather, Bergson “ask[s] . . . of the reader . . . to forget . . . the disputes between phi-
losophers” (162/10). This epoché, argues Bergson, makes possible the discovery 
of images in “the vaguest sense of the word, images perceived when my senses 
are opened to them, unperceived when they are closed” (169/17).
In opposition to realism and idealism, the image denotes “a certain existence 
that is more than what the idealist calls a representation, but less than what the 
realist calls a thing” (161/9). For Bergson, the “object exists in itself and . . . is pic-
torial as we perceive it: image it is, but an image which exists in itself ” (162/10). 
In place of Cartesian idealism’s separation of thing from thought and Cartesian 
materialism’s reduction of idea to cerebral transmissions, Bergson proposes to 
consider the common denominator of these positions, namely the image in its 
specifi c relation to the perceiver. One may even venture to say, in phenomenological 
parlance, that Bergson understands the image as the phenomenon as it appears 
to the perceiver independently of traditional scientifi c and philosophical theories. 
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The complicated status of Bergson’s image aside for the moment,4 his choice of 
term implies an innovative sense of idealism:
That every reality has a kinship, an analogy—in short, a relation with con-
sciousness, this is what we concede to idealism by the very fact that we term 
things “images.” No philosophical doctrine, moreover, provided that it is con-
sistent with itself, can escape from this conclusion. (360/229—my italics)
The apparent expansiveness of the realm of images in Bergson’s philosophy is 
undeniable. Everything, argues Bergson, is image after the epoché, including 
my body. Indeed, “the afferent nerves, . . . the brain, . . . the disturbance traveling 
through the sensory nerves and propagated in the brain”—i.e., all the signifi ca-
tions with which neuroscience operates—amount to “images” (170/19). The 
letter of Bergson’s text establishes his IC indisputably. But it is not even clear that 
IC is coherent within Bergson’s broader account.
Bergson himself qualifi es both his notion of the image and his IC. Taking the 
latter qualifi cation fi rst, Bergson insists contra idealism that we must restrict 
perception to its “true offi ce . . . [which] is to prepare actions” (360/229). And the 
foundation for this offi ce of action, i.e., perception, Bergson argues, rests in the 
body’s rudimentary preparation of actions. Here, the former qualifi cation becomes 
important for understanding the tension created by IC. Though an image among 
images, my body constitutes a part of the whole of images, which Bergson terms 
matter (173, 176/22, 25). Having obfuscated his concept of the image and tied 
perception to the body as an image among images, or a part of matter, Bergson’s 
IC begins to seem absurd (173–4/22). Moreover, to explain exactly how percep-
tion prepares actions, Bergson proposes to “simplify the conditions under which 
perception takes place” (183–4/33). This simplifi cation, which amounts to a 
schematic rendering of human perception that “exists in theory rather than fact” 
(185/34), is Bergson’s hypothesis of PP. Here is the difference: Since the hypothesis 
of PP forms the basis on which we perceive images, and since images form the 
basis of Bergson’s IC, these theories collide. The relation between the theories 
thus requires a closer look.
PP requires the philosopher to bracket all activities contributing to everyday 
concrete perception, e.g., memory, recognition, etc., and consider perception 
“confi ned to the present” cerebral interval (183–5, 212/33–4, 65). At this “lowest 
degree of the mind” (356/222), the brain connects inseparably to the whole of im-
ages, i.e., matter. Specifi cally, the brain functions as the switchboard (180, 194/30, 
45)5 through which centripetal and centrifugal forces transfer at the impersonal, 
non-subjective level of PP.6 The body’s interaction with the world in PP parallels 
that of an amoeba’s (180, 182, 203/30, 32, 55). But unlike the amoeba that reacts 
immediately to touch, the higher functioning organism enjoys a minimal free-
dom of response, a zone of indetermination, as Bergson calls it (184/34). In the 
higher functioning organism, the brain absorbs stimuli from which it prepares 
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possible actions and “chooses” (179/29) the most effi cacious neural pathway to 
satisfy its basic needs, e.g., hunger, thirst, sex etc (359–60/229). Perception thus 
arises for advanced organisms in a moment of hesitation between the stimulus 
and the response. On Bergson’s account, the brain contracts and narrows the 
whole of images, selects from this whole the partial image that suits its interest, 
and initiates bodily action (356–9/225–8).
This material and impersonal cerebral instant in PP, the rudimentary stage 
in the preparation of actions, Bergson terms the “poverty of consciousness” 
(188/38). And he deems this poverty of consciousness in PP “necessary” because 
concrete perception—that is, common sense or mundane perception before the 
hypothetical construct of PP—could not arise apart from this “material” substrate 
(183, 188–9/34, 38–9). The “absurdity” of IC now emerges. If perception arises 
from the ‘telephonic exchange’ between the brain and the world, then “no need” 
exists “for a subjective consciousness;”7 and if no need exists for a subjective 
consciousness, then, the phenomenologist retorts, Bergson’s IC appears absurd.8 
Since bodily consciousness connects to the world via the brain (359/228) on 
Bergson’s account,9 the coherence of his IC depends upon establishing a place for 
conscious perception within this vast network of image-relations (the totality of 
which, as we have seen, Bergson terms matter).
But it is precisely a place for conscious perception within PP that phenom-
enologists think Bergson’s very theory eliminates. In his typically laconic way, 
Sartre dismisses the possibility of Bergson’s IC because he (Sartre) cannot 
see how this “impersonal consciousness” in the material body “becomes the 
conscious consciousness of an individual subject.”10 Unlike Sartre’s sweeping 
charge, Merleau-Ponty specifi cally targeted Bergson’s theory of PP as the specifi c 
source of psychic blindness in Bergson’s philosophy.11 The phenomenologist 
of the lived-body believed that PP advanced a theory of the body’s perception 
based upon the brain’s mechanistic relation to the material world. Unlike his own 
phenomenological account of embodied consciousness, the early Merleau-Ponty 
considers Bergson’s account of the body in PP as an objective, scientifi c account 
that precludes a proper investigation into the intentional structures of bodily con-
sciousness. Hence, Merleau-Ponty concluded that PP constituted at best another 
form of psychologism, at worst a reductionistic materialism.12
Perhaps underscoring the phenomenological critique of Bergson, moreover, 
the latter of these charges does not ring as a criticism in the ears of recent post-
structural readings of Bergson developed out of Deleuze’s infl uential Bergsonism.13 
My point is not so much that Deleuze and those reading Bergson with Deleuze 
read Bergson as a thoroughgoing materialist; a reading of Deleuze’s What is 
Philosophy? is enough to see that he does not.14 What is interesting in this jux-
taposition of readings of Bergson is that phenomenology’s supposed allergy to 
any materialist concessions makes phenomenologists dismissive of Bergson’s IC 
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on the very score on which Deleuze and Bergsonists appreciate Bergson, namely 
the privileging of neither idealism nor materialism. On such Deleuzean inspired 
Bergsonist accounts, the redeeming quality of Bergson’s thought is the material-
ist concession that explains conscious perception with “a feature of matter in its 
most immanent mode”15 as “impersonal” (195/46). My point in carving out this 
opposition between phenomenologists and Bergsonists, then, is that from very 
different philosophical starting points and thus very different readings of Bergson, 
both camps share the same conclusion regarding Bergson’s IC. And the conclusion 
can be stated as follows according to the Deleuzean interpretation: How can one 
interpret Bergson’s IC as anything more than a “so-called concession” when his 
theory of PP admittedly deals “hardly . . . with the spirit” (365/235)?16 Indeed, as 
Merleau-Ponty put it, “the action of which Bergson is thinking is always virtual 
action, that by which the organism maintains itself in existence.”17
2. The Poverty of Consciousness: 
Foretelling but not yet Establishing the Idealistic Concession
Bergson’s theory of PP certainly appears to render his IC absurd. Bergson’s IC 
certainly requires a place for consciousness, but this place seems unlikely in an 
account perception that attributes perception to “the work of the brain.”18 To ad-
dress this issue, one might argue for a place for consciousness in PP by examining 
Bergson’s description of impoverished consciousness as the “impersonal” and 
“physical basis of my personality” (195, 209/46, 61). In his account of the body 
at the level of PP in that state of impoverished consciousness, Bergson describes 
the body as having a “double faculty” of awareness (209/61). He writes:
[T]his image [my body] always occupies the center of representation, so that 
the other images range themselves round it in the . . . order in which they might 
be subject to its actions; on the other hand, I know it from within, by sensations 
which I term affective, instead of knowing only, as in the case of other images, 
its outer skin. There is, then, in the aggregate of images, a privileged image. 
. . . [It] is this particular image which I adopt as the center of my universe . . . 
the physical basis of my personality. (209/61)
Not merely an image among the whole of images, not merely a part of matter, Bergson 
thus articulates a sense of bodily self-givenness in which the self is aware of itself 
not as an object, i.e., not as it is aware of “other images.” In this case, the reader of 
Bergson can identify a descriptive account of the distinction between fi rst-personal, 
non-objective, tacit bodily self-givenness and third-personal, objective, conceptual 
self-consciousness.19 That the impersonal founds the personal descriptively implies 
and necessarily entails that the former includes some sense of consciousness’ owner-
ship of its body’s rudimentary functions such that this impoverished consciousness 
can assimilate these experiences into the life of the self, i.e., its personality.
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The value of this approach for assessing Bergson’s idealistic concession lies 
in its readily accessible phenomenological descriptions of bodily motility in 
the mode of fi rst-person givenness. These ready examples that might elucidate 
the nature of this impersonal, fi rst-person bodily self-givenness—and thereby 
locate a place for consciousness or an IC within PP—come at the expense of an 
argumentative leap from Bergson’s account of PP, which he restricts to matter, to 
his account of concrete-perception, which he admits to include memory. At best, 
a refl ection on Bergson’s account of the body’s double function merely reports 
Bergson’s assertion of two separate claims about the body as lived-body and 
corporeal-body. But since “Bergson . . . attributes [perception] to the action of 
the body” where the “brain receives the messages coming to it from the senses 
and transforms it into a corporal movement,”20 a defense of Bergson’s IC must 
explain the interaction of these two functions of the body. Indeed, if this mecha-
nistic account of perception in PP presents the fi nal word on Bergson’s theory of 
perception, then the large issue remains: Does Bergson’s materialism in PP drive 
out anything resembling a self-aware consciousness since there must be some 
space between that which is (pre-refl exively) aware of the self (not as an object 
but precisely as self) and the self of which it is aware (non-objectively)? As dif-
fi cult questions often do, this one points precisely to the issue upon which rests 
a defi nitive resolution to the interpretive dilemma of IC.
If Bergson’s theory of PP precludes a sense of consciousness, then it also drives 
out the sensibility of his IC. But, when scrutinized closely, the materialism of 
PP becomes less pronounced. In fact, Bergson argues, PP marks the “poverty of 
consciousness” that “foretells of spirit” (188, 194/38, 45). Specifi cally, as we shall 
see, even the brain’s activity at the level of PP depends upon a minimal form of 
consciousness because PP entails duration insofar as “every sensation translates a 
. . . succession of elementary vibrations” (280/138). If PP involves a temporal span, 
as Bergson seems to suggest that it does, then the interpretive tension surrounding 
IC ultimately concerns the place and coherence of durée in Matter and Memory.
3. Translation as Transition-Synthesis: 
Establishing Bergson’s Idealistic Concesssion
Let us return for a moment to the brain’s relation to images in PP, that moment 
when the brain contracts and narrows the whole of images to select the particular 
image that suits its needs. In this instance, if the interest of the organism infl uences 
the choice of one image from the mind’s assessment of the whole of images, can 
this selection reduce to a mere neurological process? Asked differently, can this 
process of selection, depending as it does on a hesitation characterizing the higher 
organism’s response to external stimuli received from the senses, reduce to a mere 
neurological process? It seems that it cannot. Though Bernet, for example, has 
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argued against the possibility of fi nding a place on a phenomenological panel for 
Bergson, he also seems to suggest, as I would like to here, that Bergson’s account 
of the cerebral transmissions at that material level cannot amount merely to a 
neurological process. As Bernet writes,
In our view this “contraction” can no longer be attributed to a simple neuro-
logical process—even if it is not yet a question of . . . recollection or . . . explicit 
foresight. Properly speaking, this comes down to neither memory nor expecta-
tion, but to what Husserl calls a “retention” and a “protention” and which he 
furthermore qualifi es as being a “perception” of the past and the future. There 
seems to be no way of getting around the fact that such a primitive conscious-
ness of temporal duration already belongs to “pure” perception.”21
Bergson’s text seems to support Bernet’s observation, for (1) perception does not 
occur in the brain and (2) this contraction entails a ‘perception’ of the past along 
with a perception of the present, or the perception of a succession of elementary 
vibrations that the brain cannot secure.
In the section entitled “Of the Survival of Images: Memory and Mind,” Bergson 
qualifi es his examination of the brain’s function in perception. Although “physico-
chemical phenomena take place in the brain,” an image itself within the whole 
of images (matter), the brain “never occupies more than the present moment” 
and thus “cannot store up images” (290–1, 292/148–9, 151). The brain’s function 
may process elementary vibrations, but such processing occurs over time, which 
the ever-present brain cannot traverse. As such, the brain itself cannot account 
for the apprehension of successive vibrations in PP. Hence, Bergson concludes, 
it is “a chimerical enterprise to seek to localize past or even present perceptions 
in the brain: they [past or present perceptions] are not in it [the brain]; it is the 
brain that is in them” (292/151). This is the poverty of consciousness, a temporal 
awareness that foretells of spirit.
Bergson will traverse the gap between past and present vibrations by cor-
recting two classical problem concerning philosophy’s understanding of time. 
First, “nothing is less than the present moment, if you understand by that the 
indivisible limit which divides the past from the future;” second, the past itself 
cannot provide the substrate for my present, for how can that which no longer is 
“preserve itself ” (291–8/149–58)? By locating the brain in perceptions both past 
and present, Bergson means to locate the brain in “my present,” which “consists 
in the consciousness I have of my body” (280/138). The question, then, concerns 
whether Bergson attaches to the present vibration in the brain my memory of 
past vibrations as an addendum? Or, does Bergson describe a more primordial 
form of time-consciousness that distinguishes the perception of a succession of 
elementary vibrations that makes possible memory?
On a Deleuzean reading of Bergson’s resolution to this classical paradox, one 
emphasizes the distinction between PP and memory, or matter and memory, for 
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these denote ontologically separate realms somehow integrated in the higher 
organism.22 Cerebral transmissions fl eetingly pass through the switchboard brain 
and memory’s storehouse, which Bergson does not think parasitic upon the brain, 
preserves them. Memory not only can preserve the past, Deleuze contends, but 
thanks to Bergson’s discovery of a new notion of the past it also marks the condi-
tion for the possibility of the passage of time. Bergson’s distinctive discovery in 
Matter and Memory, an advance beyond his psychological theory of time from 
Time and Free Will, holds that the past constitutes a separate realm of ontological 
existence that makes possible the passage of the present into the past, for without 
considering the past as a separate ontological realm of existence the present mo-
ment would have nothing into which it could pass. On this reading, we cannot 
understand the past as the mere residue of a no longer existing present, for such 
residue needs a place to reside. The past and the present, then, must coexist, and 
this “past which never was present” constitutes the passage of time.23
That Deleuze emphasizes the importance of this discovery seems most reason-
able, for Bergson’s observes that the past continues to exist just as unperceived 
objects in space do (284, 286–7/142, 145).24 Deleuze seizes on Bergson’s notion 
of the “past in general” (275–6/133–4) treating it as something of an ontological 
reservoir.25 Here, the present and past, PP and memory, butt up against one another 
like Aristophanes’ mythical lovers just at the point when Zeus scornfully splits 
them.26 Concerning their interaction, Deleuze’s Bergson reconstructs temporal 
passage by maintaining (i) that each present cerebral instant’s nature is to pass, 
(ii) that such passage occurs thanks to the leap consciousness makes into the 
past in general, and (iii) that memory constitutes the perception of succession 
by recuperating the deceased moments of (i) relevant for the immediate experi-
ence.27 Deleuze’s Bergson thus argues for a “contemporaneity of the present and 
the past”28 that understands “my present’s” extension beyond the now to consist 
in memory plus the absolutely new (cerebral transmission).29
But this Deleuzean reading of Bergson, which holds in abeyance PP and 
memory, cannot remove the absurdity of Bergson’s IC, since it does not (wish 
to) acknowledge any such concession to idealism. Rather, this Deleuzean read-
ing insists on a fundamental dualism, a mixture of matter and memory, present 
and past, materialism and idealism. It does seem reasonable to me to deny that 
Bergson’s notion of a past in general can contribute to an understanding of the 
perception of successive states insofar as it believes itself to explain the sense of 
the past upon which time’s passage depends. It does not follow as reasonable, 
however, to countenance Deleuze’s resultant dichotomous reading. To be sure, 
Deleuze’s reading preserves the difference in kind between memory and PP upon 
which Bergson insists, even in the title of Matter and Memory (279/137). At the 
same time, however, Deleuze’s theory seems to retain the “arbitrary” defi nition of 
the present as “that which is . . . the indivisible limit which divides the past from 
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the future” (291/149–50). As such, Deleuze’s reading struggles to accommodate 
Bergson’s belief that the present is “that which is being made” (291/150).
To preserve the difference in kind between memory and perception upon 
which Bergson insists, then, one must fl esh out the more fundamental distinc-
tion in kind that Bergson articulates between memory of former and memory 
of immediate experience, a distinction Bergson confl ated in his psychological 
account of durée in Time and Free Will.30
Bergson resolves the problem of the apprehension of successive vibrations in 
PP— and thus secures the sensibility of IC—through a proto-phenomenological 
turn to the living-present, durée, that which is constantly fl owing and being 
made.31 According to Bergson, the metaphysical paradox of the preservation of 
time-past dissolves when one considers the “present such as it is actually lived by 
consciousness,” even at the impoverished level of PP (150). He writes,
In the fraction of a second which covers the briefest possible perception of 
light, billions of vibrations have taken place, of which the fi rst is separated 
from the last by an interval which is enormously divided. Your perception, 
however instantaneous, consists then in an incalculable multitude of remem-
bered elements; in truth, every perception is already memory. Practically, we 
perceive only the past. . . . Consciousness, then, illumines . . . that immediate 
part of the past which, impending over the future, seeks to realize and as-
sociate with it. (150)
We shall return in the conclusion to this important Bergsonian notion of per-
ceiving the past. For now, we should note that Bergson explains the preservation 
of time to consist in the perception of the immediate past referred to above as 
memory of the immediate (not former) experience.
Conscious perception consists not in the memorial “revival” of past vibrations 
brought into the present but the “survival” of these past impressions in the fl ow of 
conscious life, durée. And the fl ow of conscious life, durée, enables a consciousness 
of the past of the immediate experience relevant for a present action soon to be 
completed, e.g., listening to a sentence. The vibrancy and self-apprehension of 
the fl ow of conscious life enables the survival of those successive (“material”) 
vibrations in a consciousness of the past of the relevant series.32 As Bergson put 
it in Time and Free Will, durée “is the form which the succession of our conscious 
states assumes when our ego lets itself live. . . . It is because I endure . . . that I 
picture to myself what I call the past” of an object.33 Durée, then, understood as 
the consciousness of consciousness’s past (a dimension of its fl ow in general), 
makes possible the apprehension of the occurring and deceased moments of the 
successive vibrations in PP relevant for consciousness’s present concerns, thereby 
underscoring the function of PP and vindicating the sensibility of IC.34
Unfortunately, Bergson’s account in itself appears slightly confused. Is the 
extension that is the fl ow of conscious life constituted by a multitude of remem-
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bered elements? Or, does the fl ow of conscious life constitute a perception of the 
past rather than remembrance of these successively passing vibrations? To make 
clear the diffi culty facing Bergson’s account of the relation between durée and PP, 
consider Husserl’s critical self-refl ection on his early theory of time-consciousness, 
where he concluded that primary memory cannot explain the consciousness 
of succession.35 Merely attaching memory to the present fl ow, argued Husserl, 
renders the consciousness fl ow of life nonsensical, for such an account has the 
effect of confi ning the fl ow and the past of consciousness to the now that always 
is no longer. What’s more, for Husserl at least, appealing to memory to explain 
the fl ow’s apprehension of a successive object implies that “at any given moment 
I perceive only the actually present phase of the tone and the objectivity of the 
whole enduring tone is constituted in an act-continuum that is in part memory, 
in smallest part perception.”36
Memory and perception, then, mark acts different in kind, as Bergson seem-
ingly agrees despite his equivocation in using these terms (279–80/137).37 Indeed, 
something quite different occurs when I remember my tenth birthday and when I 
listen to a sentence or perceive a passing train. In order to explain this experience 
of the fl ow that constitutes the consciousness of succession, Husserl distinguishes 
retention from primary memory, much as Bergson distinguished memory of an 
immediate from memory of a former experience.38 For both, it seems, we cannot 
differentiate memory from retention merely as a matter of temporal distance. 
Memory and retention are structurally opposed: The former is an active, mediated, 
objectifying awareness of a past object, the latter a passive, immediate, non-
objectifying awareness of the elapsing phase of conscious experience.39 In short, 
memory presents the object as past, whereas retention presents a consciousness 
of the past phase of experience and thereby the object as past, a consciousness 
of the past of the object rather than a consciousness of the object as past.40 Were 
retention thought as a re-production, re-petition or re-cognition of past states, it 
would not differ from the thematizing activity of primary memory—or memory 
of a former experience, as Bergson expresses it. Given these differences, Husserl 
concludes, that retention—as an inseparable though distinguishable moment 
of the living-present—founds memory, and this is because of the role that the 
retentional moment of the living-present plays in constituting the perception of an 
temporal object, which object only can become a memory once fully constituted, 
i.e., after it has become a completed perception.
To return to Bergson’s account, just as Husserl says that retention perceives 
rather than remembers the past, Bergson says that “practically we perceive only the 
past,” and this sense of perception is not, for Bergson, memory in the traditional 
sense of the revival of a former experience. Indeed, Bergson insists, “to picture is 
not to remember” (135). This perception of the past, then, according to Bergson, 
is a consciousness of the elapsed phase of consciousness’s fl ow, its durée, by 
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which it apprehend the successive vibrations in PP. It is this insight that we have 
clarifi ed by our appeal to Husserl’s distinction between memory and retention 
despite Bergson’s unhappy description of the perception of the past as memory 
of the immediate experience.
4. Retaining Bergson’s Idealistic Concession
Even if the present account provides reasonable textual support for and validation 
of Bergson’s concession to idealism, it may not persuade either phenomenolo-
gists or Bergsonists. The important point to note, it seems to me, however, is that 
Bergson’s notion of a memory of immediate experience entails a “poverty of con-
sciousness” that amounts to an activity that provides a transition-synthesis—a 
retentional mode of intentionality—that translates cerebral vibrations into images, 
phenomena.41 If my reading of Bergson’s idealistic concession is persuasive, then 
since it entails a theory of the life of consciousness in its retentional-intentional 
relation to the world, we are left to choose between clarifying or dismissing his 
IC. That is, we argue for a mechanical, cerebral relation that precludes subjectiv-
ity’s awareness of itself and objects, or we see the self apprehending itself and 
therefore phenomena in the world by way of understanding the apprehension of 
successive cerebral vibrations as a pre-refl ective, “impersonal” self-consolidating 
that makes possible ‘memory’ of immediate experiences and thereby memory of 
former experiences. The former approach cannot reconcile Bergson’s IC, while the 
latter approach can accommodate Bergson’s IC. It seems that the letter and spirit 
of Bergson’s text calls us to reject the former option in favor of the latter.
As I noted at the close of section two of this essay, a defense of Bergson’s IC must 
explain the interaction of the “double-awareness” enjoyed by the body. Indeed, 
if this mechanistic account of perception in PP presents the fi nal word on Berg-
son’s theory of perception, then Bergson’s materialism in PP drives out anything 
resembling a self-aware consciousness since there must be some space between 
that which is (pre-refl exively) aware of the self (not as an object but precisely 
as self) and the self of which it is aware (non-objectively)? But the materialism 
underscoring the hypothesis of PP is not the end of the story. Indeed, Bergson 
identifi es the brain only as a “necessary condition” for experience, for “the cerebral 
mechanism does indeed in some sort condition memories but is in no way suf-
fi cient to ensure their survival” (222/75). That the brain constitutes a necessary 
but not suffi cient condition for experience is not anathema to phenomenology 
and thus on this reading does not undermine Bergson’s concession to idealism; 
Husserl himself maintained that the neurophysiologic events in a human organ-
ism constitute the “‘turning point’ where causal relations are transformed into 
conditional relations between external world and the Bodily-psychic subject.”42 
Such a synthesis of these cerebral moments cannot stem from a reduction of 
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conscious perception to the brain because the brain is a “thing like others” and 
“it would be absurd that the container should issue the content” (190/41). That 
is, under Bergson’s hypothesis of PP, moreover, the body considered as the brain 
can be nothing otherwise than a necessary condition because it has no time, i.e., 
it “never occupies more than the present moment” and thus appears anew each 
moment (291/149). Since perception arises only when consciousness brings these 
cerebral moments together, Bergson maintains that “pure perception, . . . however 
rapid we suppose it to be, occupies a certain depth of duration, so that our suc-
cessive perceptions are never the real moments of things . . . but the moments of 
our consciousness” (216/69).
In the fi nal analysis, since cerebral activity itself cannot experience the time 
delay that it creates, Bergson concludes that experience must result from time-
consciousness and its intersection with the body. Summarizing his fi ndings from 
Matter and Memory, Bergson writes,
[T]he humblest function of spirit is to bind together successive moments of the 
duration of things. . . . We note that [the nervous system’s] increasing complex-
ity appears to allow an ever greater latitude to the activity of the living being, 
the faculty of waiting before reacting. . . . The more complex organization of 
the nervous system . . . is only the material symbol of that independence itself 
. . . the symbol of the inner energy which allows the being to free itself from the 
rhythm of the fl ow of things and to retain in an ever higher degree the past in 
order to infl uence ever more deeply the future. (352/221–2)
And this is why, Bergson, although he maintains that perception includes a motor 
phenomenon, consistently describes the human body as an ambiguous center 
characterized by a “double faculty” that I “know . . . from within, by sensations 
which I term affective, instead of knowing only, as in the case of other [objects], 
its outer skin” (209/61). Rather than examining the intrinsic properties of neural 
systems as a positivist or vitalist, Bergson establishes mind and matter as neces-
sary conditions for living and experiencing by focusing on the dynamic interplay 
of the body, its neural activity and the world. Bergson’s insights into the ‘turning 
point’ from matter to ‘memory’ (of immediate experience, or retention) at least 
place his philosophy on a parallel rather than perpendicular plane to phenomenol-
ogy. But, Bergson’s parallel plane, which itself includes a concession to idealism, 
might benefi t from and benefi t phenomenology, for as Husserl writes,
It can be said that, if [the] psychology of cognition had ever gone to work with 
a consciousness of its aim and had consequently been successful, its results 
would also have been work accomplished directly for the philosophic theory of 
cognition. All insights into structure that had been acquired for the psychology 
of cognition would also have benefi ted transcendental philosophy.43
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Read in this way, Husserl’s distinction between memory and retention makes 
explicit Bergson’s implicit distinction between memory and perception. And this 
distinction between memory and retention allows the sensibility of Bergson’s IC 
to shine forth, a glimmer that, in turn, shines new light on phenomenologists’ 
dismissal of Bergson’s thought, as well as the contemporary Deleuzean inspired 
Bergsonist revivals of his thought.
NOTES
1. H. Bergson, Matter and Memory, trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer (New York: Zone 
Books, 1991). All references to Bergson’s work with the pagination of the English 
translation following the pagination of H. Bergson, Œuvres. Édition du Centenaire 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959). Henceforth cited parenthetically by 
page number alone; no other work will receive parenthetical citation.
2. For a few examples of phenomenological thinkers who express reservations about 
Bergson’s philosophical project and his idealistic concession see R. Barbaras, “Le 
problème de l’expérience: proximité ou corrélation? Bergson et la phenomenol-
ogy” in Vie et intentionnalité Recherches phénoménologiques (Paris: Vrin 2004); R. 
Barbaras, Introduction à une phénoménologie de la vie (Paris: Vrin 2008), 141–56; R. 
Bernet, “A Present Folded Back on the Past (Bergson),” Research in Phenomenology 
35 (2005): 55–76; J. P. Sartre, Imagination, trans. F. Williams (Ann Arbor: University 
of Michigan Press, 1962); M. Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, trans. A. L. 
Fisher (Pittsburgh: Duquense University Press, 1983); D. Zahavi, “Life, Thinking 
and Phenomenology in the Early Bergson,” in Bergson and Phenomenology, ed. M. 
Kelly (London: Palgrave, forthcoming). On the Bergsonist side, Keith Ansell-Pearson, 
Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual: Bergson and the Time of Life (New York: 
Routledge, 2002); G. Deleuze, Bergsonism, trans. H. Tomlinson and B. Habberjam 
(New York: Zone Books, 1999); L. Lawlor, The Challenge of Bergsonism (London: 
Continuum Press, 2003); Frédéric Worms, “La conscience ou la vie? Bergson entre 
phénomenologie et métaphysique” in Annales Bergsoniennes II: Bergson, Deleuze, 
La Phénoménologie, ed. Frédéric Worms (Presses Universitaires de France, 2004), 
191–206. Other works expressing similar reservations along these party lines will 
emerge throughout the course of this essay.
3. Cf. Lawlor, The Challenge of Bergsonism, chap. 1, where Lawlor compares the meth-
odological assumption orienting Matter and Memory with Husserl’s notion of the 
epoché.
4. The notion of the image in Bergson’s thought is one of his most perplexing. A quick 
glance at the concept may make it appear to resemble Kant’s conception of phenom-
ena. But Bergson quite clearly argues against such a reading. Sartre has provided the 
most sustained refl ections on this issue. See Sartre, Imagination.
5. Cf. Lawlor, The Challenge of Bergsonism, 16.
6. Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual, 151. We have in the 
theory of pure perception Bergson’s reminder that we have left behind not only the 
412 Michael Kelly
Cartesian material-realism that sequesters the theater of the mind on which images 
of the world play, but also the traditional al Cartesian idealism that would “fain go 
without [matter]” (MM 34, 39).
7. Bernet, “A Present Folded Back on the Past,” 60ff. Cf. Sartre, Imagination, 39–40.
8. Sartre, Imagination, 40. As Bernet has recently put it, it seems impossible to fi nd 
space for Bergson on a “phenomenological panel” given his theory of PP; Bernet, “A 
Present Folded Back on the Past,” 61. Indeed, Bernet writes, since “Bergson attributes 
[perception] to the action of the body . . . there is no need for a subjective conscious-
ness to introduce a break into the machinery of the universe.”
9. Bergson writes, “Here is my body with its ‘perceptive centers.’ . . . Where is it? I cannot 
hesitate as to the answer: positing my body, I posit a certain image, but with it also 
the aggregate of other images, since there is no material image which does not owe 
its qualities, its determinations, in short, its existence to the place which it occupies 
in the totality of the universe.”
10. Sartre, Imagination, 40.
11. Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 162. Cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, The Incarnate 
Subject: Malebranche, Biran, and Bergson on the Union of Body and Soul, trans. P. Milan 
(Amherst, N.Y.: Humanity Books, 2001), 89. In that text, Merleau-Ponty claims that 
Bergon’s theory of pure perception suffers from a “psychic blindness,” a materialism 
“blind” to the issue of intentional consciousness and the body’s directedness toward 
self and other.
12. “When Bergson stresses the unity of perception and action and invents . . . the term 
‘sensory motor process,’ he is clearly seeking to involve consciousness in the world. 
. . . Generally speaking, Bergson saw that the body and the mind try to communicate 
with each other. . . . But the body remains for him what we have called the objective 
body . . . and one cannot see why . . . consciousness becomes in involved in a body 
and a world.” M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith (New 
York: Routledge, 1995), 78n2.
13. Deleuze, Bergsonism.
14. G. Deleuze and F. Guattari, What is Philosophy?, trans. H. Tomlinson and G. Burchell 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 48–9.
15. Ansell-Pearson, Philosophy and the Adventure of the Virtual, 141, 156.
16. Lawlor, The Challenge of Bergsonism, 9.
17. Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 176. Cf. Barbaras, Introduction à une phé-
noménologie de la vie, 148. Although it goes beyond the scope of this essay, the reader 
should note that Merleau-Ponty later in his career ultimately comes to a greater ap-
preciation of Bergson’s thought. As he writes in “The Philosophy of Existence” (1959), 
“If we had been careful readers of Bergson, and if more thought had been given to 
him, we would have been drawn to a much more concrete philosophy, to a philosophy 
much less refl exive than Brunschvicg’s. But since Bergson was hardly read by my 
contemporaries, it is certain that we had to wait for the philosophies of existence 
in order to be able to learn much of what he would have been able to teach us. It is 
quite certain—as we realize more and more today—that Bergson, has we read him 
carefully, would have taught us things that ten or fi fteen years later we believed to be 
A Phenomenological Defense of Bergson’s “Idealistic Concession” 413
discoveries made by the philosophy of existence itself.” M. Merelau-Ponty, Texts and 
Dialogues, ed. H. Silverman and J. Barry, Jr., trans. M. Smith et al. (Atlantic Highlands, 
N.J.: Humanities Press, 1992), 132.
18. Bernet, “A Present Folded Back on the Past,” 56.
19. For a discussion of the distinction between first- and third-person modes of 
bodily self-givenness, see D. Zahavi, Self-awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenologi-
cal Investigation (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1999); as well as his 
Subjectivity and Self-hood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective (Cambridge, 
Mass.: The MIT Press, 2005).
20. Bernet, “A Present Folded Back on the Past,” 60.
21. Cf. ibid., 61. Despite this claim, the reader should note that Bernet still resists a phe-
nomenological reading of Bergson. See note vii herein.
22. Deleuze, Bergsonism, chap. 3.
23. G. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. P. Patton (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1994), 82.
24. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 58–9. Cf. A. Al-Saji, “The Memory of Another Past: Bergson, 
Deleuze and a New Theory of Time,” Continental Philosophy Review 37 (2004): 
203–39.
25. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 59; Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, 81.
26. Plato, “Symposium,” trans. M. Joyce, in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed. E. Hamilton 
and H. Cairns (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 542–3, 190a–e.
27. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, chap. 2, “Repetition in Itself.”
28. Deleuze, Bergsonism, 59
29. Lawlor, The Challenge of Bergsonism, ix.
30. For an account of this confl ation, see M. Kelly, “Husserl, Deleuzean Bergsonism and 
the Sense of the Past in General,” Husserl Studies 24 (2008) 15–30.
31. That a similarity exists between Bergson’s notion of duration and Husserl’s notion of 
inner time-consciousness is a matter of great dispute. In addition to Deleuze’s clear 
appreciation for Bergson’s account of time-consciousness over Husserl’s as noted 
in Chapter II, “Repetition in Itself ” of Difference and Repetition (London: Athlone 
Press, 1994), two papers inspired by the tradition of Deleuzean-Bergsonism recently 
defended Bergson’s theory of time at the expense of Husserl’s account of time: S. 
Crocker, “The Past is to Time What the Idea is to Thought or, What is General in 
the Past in General,” Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol. 35, no. 1: 
42–53; Al-Saji, “The Memory of Another Past,” 204. Nevertheless, without dismiss-
ing Deleuze’s contributions to Bergson’s theory of time, Rudolf Bernet recently has 
argued that a similarity exists between Bergson’s theory of the duration associated 
with pure perception and Husserl’s theory of the living-present with its notions 
of retention and protention: Bernet, “A Present Folded Back on the Past,” 61. For a 
fuller account that pursues a line similar to Bernet’s suggestion, see Kelly, “Husserl, 
Deleuzean Bergsonism and the Sense of the Past in General.”
414 Michael Kelly
32. This is perhaps why Bergson entitles the chapter dealing with PP and time-con-
sciousness “Of the Survival of Images. Memory and Mind” rather than on the revival 
of images.
33. H. Bergson, Time and Free Will, trans. F. L. Pogson (Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications, 
2001), 100, 108.
34. Bernet, “A Present Folded Back on the Past,” 61.
35. E. Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917), 
trans. J. Brough (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 23, 130.
36. Ibid., 25.
37. Bergson writes, “the illusion which consists in establishing only a difference of degree 
between memory and perception is more than a mere consequence of associationism, 
more than an accident in the history of philosophy. It roots lie deep. It rests, in the 
last analysis, on a false idea of the nature and of the object of external perception. . . . 
But there is much more between past and present than a mere difference of degree. 
My present is that which interests me, which lives for me, and in a word, that which 
summons me to action; in contrast, my past is essentially powerless.”
38. While this is not the place to engage in a sustained defense of Husserl’s theory of the 
living-present against possible Bergsonian objections, I feel compelled to make the 
following brief remark. Husserl certainly describes the living-present according to 
the distinguishable yet inseparable moments of retention, primal impression and 
protention. Such a description, however, does not render these moments divorced 
from one another, thereby requiring a synthesis to rejoin them; against this potential 
Bergsonian worry, the reader of Husserl’s time-consciousness writings must keep it 
in mind that Husserl regards the fl ow as a non-temporal temporalizing, an identity 
in a manifold that in no way resembles a series of morsels of lived-experience that 
require re-connection (for such a view implies that these moments are spread out 
in temporal order, which Husserl maintains they are not).
39. R. Cobb-Stevens, “James and Husserl: Time-Consciousness and the Intentionality 
of Presence and Absence,” in Self-Awareness, Temporality and Alterity, ed. D. Zahavi 
(Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999), 45.
40. Husserl, On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893–1917), 
31, 324.
41. One may justifi ably wonder at this stage if Bergson has not traded in one Husserlian 
concern for another. On the one hand, the reader of Bergson can explain away the 
confl ation of memory and retention upon which rests the confl ation between memory 
and perception. On the other hand, when Bergson claims that to picture is not to 
remember, one might ask whether or not this expression distinguishes perception 
from memory or imagination from memory. The notion of picturing rightfully tempts 
one to conclude the latter. This presents a certain diffi culty for a phenomenological 
interpretation of Bergson’s account of time-consciousness. It is well-known that 
Husserl rejected Brentano’s account of originary association because it accounted for 
the extension of perception beyond the now by making recourse to the imagination, 
a move that reduced perception to imagination rather than explaining its extension 
beyond the now. To picture may not be to remember, but to perceive is not merely to 
A Phenomenological Defense of Bergson’s “Idealistic Concession” 415
image. At any rate, an attempt to address this diffi culty must reckon with Bergson’s 
account of the image mentioned in section one and tease out its relation to percep-
tion, a task well beyond the scope of this brief inquiry.
42. E. Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological 
Philosophy, Second Book, trans. R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1989), 169.
43. E. Husserl, Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. D. Cairns, (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1969), 254.

